# Phase 150 compliance control matrix

Status date: 2026-07-14. This is an engineering control-to-evidence map, not a
certification, legal opinion, HIPAA risk analysis, or GDPR impact assessment.
Organisational controls, production configuration, vendor management, and
independent audit remain deployment responsibilities.

| Implemented technical control                                                                      | SOC 2 TSC    | HIPAA Security Rule                        | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A     | GDPR                  | Repository evidence                                                                                                 |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------ | --------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Strong KDF, per-vault/per-item keys, authenticated encryption, rotation, and cryptographic erasure | CC6.1, CC6.7 | 164.312(a)(2)(iv), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)       | A.8.24, A.8.10                 | Arts. 5(1)(f), 25, 32 | `libs/neith/vault-crypto`, `libs/neith/vault-recovery`                                                              |
| Versioned envelope encryption with non-extractable PKCS #11 key-encryption keys                    | CC6.1, CC6.7 | 164.312(a)(2)(iv), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)       | A.8.24, A.8.10                 | Arts. 25, 32          | `libs/neith/vault-engine/src/hsm-kms.ts`                                                                            |
| Tenant namespaces, path/capability policy, collection ACLs, least-privilege roles                  | CC6.1–CC6.3  | 164.308(a)(4), 164.312(a)(1)               | A.5.15–A.5.18, A.8.3           | Arts. 25, 32          | `libs/neith/vault-engine/src/namespace.ts`, `policy.ts`; `libs/neith/vault-share`                                   |
| MFA/passkey and managed/compliant-device enforcement                                               | CC6.1, CC6.6 | 164.312(d)                                 | A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.1           | Art. 32               | `libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/policy.ts`                                                                         |
| Signed, chained administrative, sharing, and engine audit records                                  | CC7.2, CC7.3 | 164.312(b), 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D)           | A.8.15, A.8.16                 | Arts. 5(2), 30, 32    | `libs/neith/vault-engine/src/audit.ts`, `libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/audit.ts`, `libs/neith/vault-share`        |
| Offboarding, session/device revocation, access transfer, and consented/HSM-escrowed recovery       | CC6.2, CC6.3 | 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C), 164.308(a)(4)        | A.5.16, A.5.18, A.6.5          | Arts. 25, 32          | `libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/offboarding.ts`, `escrow.ts`; `libs/neith/vault-recovery`                          |
| Encrypted sync/backup, region pinning, retrievability proof, and offline recovery                  | CC7.4, A1.2  | 164.308(a)(7), 164.312(e)(1)               | A.5.29, A.5.30, A.8.13, A.8.14 | Arts. 5(1)(e)–(f), 32 | `libs/neith/vault-sync`                                                                                             |
| Quorum replication, fenced failover, authenticated catch-up, and controlled DR promotion           | CC7.4, A1.2  | 164.308(a)(7)                              | A.5.29, A.5.30, A.8.14         | Art. 32               | `libs/neith/vault-engine/src/ha.ts`                                                                                 |
| Breach, weak/reused-password, expiry, HTTP, and EDR stuffing monitoring                            | CC7.2, CC7.3 | 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) | A.5.7, A.8.16                  | Arts. 32, 33          | `libs/neith/vault-watchtower`                                                                                       |
| Data-loss copy policy, aggregate-only reporting/telemetry, travel purge                            | CC6.7, CC6.8 | 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(e)(1)               | A.8.12, A.8.11, A.8.1          | Arts. 5(1)(c), 25, 32 | `libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/dlp.ts`, `reporting.ts`, `travel.ts`; `libs/neith/vault-autofill/src/telemetry.ts` |

## Open assurance and deployment dependencies

- No SOC 2 examination, ISO 27001 certification audit, HIPAA risk analysis or
  business-associate workflow, or GDPR DPIA/records-of-processing exercise is
  represented by this matrix.
- Retention configuration and Apple/Windows/native-runtime validation remain
  open Phase 150 requirements. Android phone/Wear implementation and compiled
  automation exist, but still require device/KVM execution. Production HSM/KMS
  and multi-host HA deployments and their operator ceremonies remain deployment
  responsibilities beyond the exercised local integrations.
- Production evidence must add operator access reviews, key ceremonies, incident
  exercises, backup restore records, vulnerability management, availability
  measurements, and jurisdiction-specific retention/deletion decisions.
- Control owners must validate that deployed settings and contracts match the
  applicable organisation, data categories, threat model, and legal roles.
