Eve library

Demeter API — OWASP Top 10 (2021) Security Assessment

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Scope: apps/demeter/api (Fastify REST API, Postgres/Drizzle persistence). Date: 2026-05-31. Task: TODOS/phase-29 §29.18.5.1.

This assessment maps each OWASP Top 10 (2021) category to the concrete controls implemented in the Demeter API and to the automated tests that verify them, and records residual gaps with recommendations. Test references are to src/__tests__/security.test.ts (61 cases, executed against a live demeter_test database) and the integration suite under test/integration/.

Status legend: Covered = control present and test-verified · Partial = control present, residual gap noted · Deployment = handled at the infrastructure/ops layer (tracked separately under §29.19).


A01:2021 — Broken Access Control — Covered#

  • Every authenticated route requires a valid bearer JWT via the authenticate preHandler; protected routes reject anonymous requests with 401.
  • Resource ownership is enforced inline in each route against the owning user id (gardens by userId; beds/plantings/harvests/observations/sensors via FK chains to the owning garden; community posts by author for private posts). Cross-tenant access returns 404 (existence-hiding) rather than 403 where appropriate.
  • Non-UUID / malformed ids are guarded (isUuid) and resolve to 404 instead of leaking a database error.
  • Verified by: Security: Authorization Boundaries (29.18.5.2/.3), per-resource ownership assertions in the integration specs (gardens/plantings/harvests/observations/community), and the concurrent-users isolation test (test/performance/concurrent-users).

A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures — Partial#

  • Passwords are hashed with bcryptjs (salted, configurable cost) — src/routes/auth.ts (bcrypt.hash / bcrypt.compare); plaintext passwords are never stored or logged.
  • Access tokens are signed JWTs (@fastify/jwt); refresh tokens are random, hashed at rest, and rotated. OAuth provider tokens are verified against provider JWKS via jose (src/auth/oauth-verifiers.ts).
  • Residual gaps: (1) Encryption at rest for the database/object storage is a Deployment concern (§29.18.5.8 — RDS/volume encryption). (2) Encryption in transit (TLS termination) is a Deployment concern (§29.18.5.9). (3) JWT uses symmetric HS256 with a shared secret; if tokens must be verified by independent services, migrate to asymmetric RS256/EdDSA.

A03:2021 — Injection — Covered#

  • All database access goes through Drizzle ORM parameterized queries — no string-concatenated SQL anywhere in the store layer (src/db/*).
  • All request bodies/queries are validated and coerced by Zod schemas before use; unknown fields are dropped by the Fastify JSON schema.
  • NUL bytes are stripped from free-text input (src/db/text-utils.ts) so hostile payloads cannot raise encoding errors or corrupt rows.
  • Verified by: Security: SQL Injection Prevention (29.18.5.4) (payloads in query params, body strings, and path params) and Security: XSS Prevention (29.18.5.5) (script-tag and event-handler payloads are stored inertly and echoed without server-side execution; rendering layers escape on output).

A04:2021 — Insecure Design — Covered#

  • Rate limiting is designed in tiers (anonymous / authenticated / auth-endpoint / IoT-device) with burst allowance — src/plugins/rate-limit.ts.
  • Refresh-token rotation with family-based reuse detection: replaying a rotated token revokes the entire token family (src/db/auth-store.ts).
  • Magic links are single-use; sessions are tracked with device/IP metadata and evicted on limit.
  • Verified by: Security: Rate Limiting (29.18.5.7), auth integration spec (rotation + reuse-detection cases).

A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration — Covered#

  • Hardening response headers are emitted on every reply (success, error, and 404) via src/plugins/security-headers.ts: Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none', X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin, X-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off, and Strict-Transport-Security (honored over TLS). A maximally restrictive CSP is appropriate because the API only returns JSON.
  • CORS is configured from validated app config (explicit allowed-origin list or *) — src/plugins/cors.ts.
  • The global error handler returns sanitized messages and never leaks stack traces or internal details for 5xx responses — src/plugins/error-handler.ts.
  • Configuration is schema-validated at boot (src/config.ts); the development JWT_SECRET default is rejected outside development by a superRefine check.
  • Verified by: Security: Additional Hardening (header assertions on an unauthenticated 404).

A06:2021 — Vulnerable and Outdated Components — Covered#

  • Dependencies are centrally version-pinned via the pnpm catalog (pnpm-workspace.yaml); a dependency vulnerability scan is run as part of the security workstream (§29.18.5.10).
  • Recommendation: keep the scan wired into CI so regressions surface on every dependency bump.

A07:2021 — Identification and Authentication Failures — Covered#

  • Strong password hashing (bcrypt), strict auth-endpoint rate limits (5 + 2 burst per IP) to throttle credential stuffing/brute force, short-lived access tokens with rotating refresh tokens, single-use magic links, and verified OAuth (Google/Apple/Facebook) sign-in.
  • Verified by: Security: Authentication Bypass (29.18.5.2) (tampered / expired / wrong-secret / missing tokens rejected) and the auth integration suite (login/logout/refresh/magic-link/OAuth/session/API-key flows).

A08:2021 — Software and Data Integrity Failures — Covered#

  • Token integrity is enforced cryptographically: tampered JWTs fail signature verification; rotated-then-replayed refresh tokens trip family reuse detection and invalidate the family.
  • OAuth assertions are verified against provider JWKS rather than trusted blindly (jose).
  • Verified by: auth integration spec (payload-tampered tokens rejected; reuse-detection revocation).

A09:2021 — Security Logging and Monitoring Failures — Partial#

  • Structured request logging (pino) with a per-request requestId correlation id; auth-significant events (register/login/logout/refresh, ownership failures) are logged with context.
  • Residual gap: centralized log aggregation, alerting, and anomaly detection are Deployment concerns (CloudWatch/SIEM, §29.19). Recommendation: ship structured logs to a central sink and alert on auth-failure spikes.

A10:2021 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — Low risk#

  • The only outbound HTTP the API performs is the weather provider, which targets a fixed Open-Meteo host derived from server config — never a user-supplied URL (src/weather/weather-provider.ts). There is no user-controlled fetch surface.
  • Recommendation: keep the weather host on a config allowlist; if any user-supplied URL fetching is added later, validate against an allowlist and block private/link-local address ranges.

Summary#

Category Status
A01 Broken Access Control Covered
A02 Cryptographic Failures Partial (at-rest/in-transit = deployment)
A03 Injection Covered
A04 Insecure Design Covered
A05 Security Misconfiguration Covered
A06 Vulnerable Components Covered
A07 Identification & Auth Failures Covered
A08 Software & Data Integrity Covered
A09 Logging & Monitoring Partial (centralized monitoring = deployment)
A10 SSRF Low risk

Application-layer posture: all application-layer controls are in place and test-verified (the A05 security-header gap surfaced by this assessment was remediated with src/plugins/security-headers.ts). The remaining residual items — encryption at rest (§29.18.5.8), TLS in transit (§29.18.5.9), and centralized log aggregation/alerting (A09) — are deployment-layer controls tracked under §29.19. A future consideration is asymmetric (RS256/EdDSA) JWT signing if tokens must be verified by independent services.