Eve library

Auditor FAQ

Guide

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Frequently Asked Questions for Smart Contract Auditors#


General Questions#

Q1: What is the primary purpose of the Lilith Platform?#

The Lilith Platform enables creators to:

  1. Tokenize access to their content using ERC-1155 access tokens
  2. Issue unique content licenses as ERC-721 NFTs
  3. Receive automated royalty distributions
  4. Build on-chain reputation through identity staking

Q2: What are the main entry points for external calls?#

User-facing functions:

  • AccessToken.purchaseTokens() - Purchase access tokens
  • ContentLicenseNFT.issueLicense() - Mint content license
  • CreatorRoyalties.withdrawRoyalty() - Claim pending royalties
  • IdentityReputation.registerIdentity() - Register new identity
  • IdentityReputation.stake() / unstake() - Manage stakes

Admin functions:

  • *.pause() / unpause() - Emergency controls
  • *.transferOwnership() - Ownership transfer (two-step)
  • *Upgradeable.upgradeToAndCall() - Contract upgrades
  • AccessToken.updateTreasury() - Change fee recipient
  • AccessToken.setPlatformFeePercentage() - Change fees

Oracle functions:

  • IdentityReputation.updateReputation() - Update scores
  • IdentityReputation.slashStake() - Slash bad actors
  • IdentityReputation.resolveChallenge() - Resolve disputes

Q3: How is ETH handled in the system?#

Inflows:

  1. Token purchases (purchaseTokens{value: X}())
  2. Identity staking (stake{value: X}())

Outflows:

  1. Creator withdrawals (withdrawRoyalty() - pull pattern)
  2. Pending payment claims (claimPendingPayment())
  3. Stake unstaking (unstake())
  4. Admin treasury withdrawal (withdrawToTreasury())

Safety measures:

  • ReentrancyGuard on all external call paths
  • CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) pattern
  • Pull payment pattern instead of push

Q4: What external dependencies exist?#

Dependency Usage
OpenZeppelin Contracts 5.x ERC standards, access control, security
OpenZeppelin Upgradeable 5.x UUPS upgrade pattern
Solidity 0.8.20+ Native overflow protection

No price oracles are used. Token prices are set by creators.


Q5: How are upgrades handled?#

  1. Pattern: UUPS (Universal Upgradeable Proxy Standard)
  2. Authorization: Only owner can initiate
  3. Timelock: 72 hours delay via TimelockController
  4. Process:
    • Owner schedules upgrade
    • 72-hour waiting period
    • Community can review
    • Owner executes upgrade
    • Cancel possible during delay

Storage safety:

  • Storage gap patterns in all contracts
  • Initializer functions for state setup
  • Storage layout compatibility testing

Security Questions#

Q6: How is reentrancy prevented?#

  1. ReentrancyGuard: Applied to all functions with external calls
  2. CEI Pattern: State changes before external calls
  3. Pull Payments: Users claim funds, not pushed
  4. No callbacks: ERC-1155 safe transfers with reentrancy guard

Example pattern:

solidity
function withdraw() external nonReentrant {
    uint256 amount = pendingBalance[msg.sender];  // Check
    pendingBalance[msg.sender] = 0;                // Effect
    (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");  // Interaction
    require(success, "Transfer failed");
}

Q7: How are flash loan attacks prevented?#

The FlashLoanGuard library tracks the last action block for each user:

solidity
mapping(address => uint256) private _lastActionBlock;

modifier flashLoanProtected() {
    require(block.number > _lastActionBlock[msg.sender], "SameBlock");
    _lastActionBlock[msg.sender] = block.number;
    _;
}

Applied to:

  • Token purchases
  • License minting
  • Staking operations
  • Royalty claims

Q8: What access control model is used?#

Ownable2Step: Two-step ownership transfer

  • Owner proposes new owner
  • New owner must accept
  • Prevents accidental transfers

Role-based for specific functions:

  • PAUSER_ROLE: Pause/unpause
  • ORACLE_ROLE: Reputation updates
  • VERIFIER_ROLE: Content verification

Q9: How are funds protected in case of compromise?#

  1. Multi-sig ownership: 3/5 Gnosis Safe
  2. Timelock: 72h delay on critical operations
  3. Pause capability: Emergency stop
  4. Pull payments: Users control withdrawals
  5. No infinite approvals: Standard transfer patterns
  6. Monitoring: On-chain alerts for sensitive events

Q10: What happens if the owner key is compromised?#

Immediate impact:

  • Attacker can pause contracts
  • Attacker can change fees (bounded)
  • Attacker cannot immediately upgrade (72h delay)
  • Attacker cannot directly access user funds

Response:

  1. Alert on ownership transfer detected
  2. Cancel any scheduled operations
  3. Rotate keys via multi-sig
  4. Deploy patched contracts if needed

Economic Questions#

Q11: What are the fee structures?#

Fee Type Default Maximum Recipient
Platform fee 2.5% 10% Treasury
Royalties Creator-defined 25% Creator

Fee calculation:

solidity
uint256 platformFee = amount * platformFeePercentage / 10000;
uint256 creatorAmount = amount - platformFee;

Q12: How are royalties distributed?#

  1. Marketplace calls distributeRoyalty(tokenId, amount)
  2. Platform fee deducted
  3. Net amount added to creator's pending balance
  4. Creator calls withdrawRoyalty() to claim

Only authorized marketplaces can trigger distributions.


Q13: What is the staking mechanism?#

Purpose: Reputation collateral

Operations:

  • stake{value: amount}() - Add stake
  • unstake(amount) - Remove stake (with checks)
  • slashStake(user, amount, reason) - Penalty (oracle only)

Constraints:

  • Minimum stake: 0.01 ETH
  • Cannot unstake below minimum while registered
  • Slashing requires oracle authorization

Technical Questions#

Q14: What Solidity version and why?#

Version: 0.8.20+

Reasons:

  • Native overflow/underflow protection
  • Custom errors for gas efficiency
  • Latest security patches
  • UUPS pattern compatibility

Q15: Are there any known gas optimization opportunities?#

Yes, some areas identified:

  1. Batch operations could use unchecked loops
  2. Some storage reads could be cached
  3. Events could be more gas-efficient

Note: Security was prioritized over gas optimization.


Q16: How is randomness handled?#

No on-chain randomness is used.

All operations are deterministic based on:

  • User inputs
  • Block properties (number, timestamp)
  • Contract state

Q17: What are the batch operation limits?#

Operation Recommended Limit Gas Limit
Batch license mint 100 ~15M gas
Batch transfer 50 ~10M gas

Limits enforced in contract to prevent DoS.


Testing Questions#

Q18: What testing has been done?#

  1. Unit tests: 100% function coverage
  2. Integration tests: Cross-contract interactions
  3. Security tests:
    • Reentrancy scenarios
    • Access control bypass attempts
    • Flash loan attack simulations
    • CEI pattern verification
    • DoS resistance
  4. Fuzzing: Foundry fuzz tests on critical paths
  5. Invariant tests: Economic invariants verified

Q19: What static analysis tools were used?#

  • Slither (static analyzer)
  • Mythril (symbolic execution)
  • Solhint (linting)
  • Hardhat coverage

Q20: Is there a deployed testnet version?#

Yes, contracts are deployed on:

  • Sepolia testnet
  • Goerli testnet (deprecated, migrating)

Testnet addresses available in deployment artifacts.


Contact Information#

For questions during the audit:

  • Technical Lead: [Contact via secure channel]
  • Response Time: < 4 hours during business hours
  • Secure Document Sharing: [Encrypted channel]
  • Code Repository: Private GitHub (access provided)

Document Versions#

Document Version Last Updated
Architecture 1.0 2024-Q4
Threat Model 1.0 2024-Q4
Trust Assumptions 1.0 2024-Q4
This FAQ 1.0 2024-Q4