Overview#
This document lists known issues, limitations, and their mitigations. These have been identified during internal review and are documented for transparency.
Critical Issues#
No unmitigated critical issues.
High Severity Issues#
H-1: Centralized Oracle Trust#
Description: The reputation system relies on a centralized oracle for score updates and challenge resolution.
Impact: A compromised or malicious oracle could:
- Unfairly increase/decrease reputation scores
- Wrongly slash user stakes
- Resolve challenges incorrectly
Current Mitigation:
- Oracle is operated by the platform team
- All actions are logged on-chain
- Challenge system allows disputes
Future Mitigation:
- Multi-oracle implementation planned
- DAO governance for oracle selection
- Reputation bounds limit single updates
Status: Accepted with mitigations
Medium Severity Issues#
M-1: Off-Chain Transfer Royalty Evasion#
Description: Royalties can only be enforced on authorized marketplace sales. Direct wallet-to-wallet transfers bypass royalty payments.
Impact: Creators may lose royalty revenue on off-chain deals.
Current Mitigation:
- On-chain enforcement for marketplace sales
- ERC-2981 standard for royalty signaling
- Marketplace authorization system
Future Mitigation:
- Industry-wide solution needed
- NFT royalty enforcement EIPs in development
Status: Industry-wide limitation, mitigated where possible
M-2: Upgrade Centralization#
Description: Contract upgrades are controlled by a single owner address (multi-sig).
Impact: Multi-sig compromise could lead to malicious upgrades.
Current Mitigation:
- 3/5 multi-sig requirement
- 72-hour timelock on upgrades
- On-chain monitoring for scheduled upgrades
- Cancel capability during delay
Future Mitigation:
- DAO governance for upgrades
- Additional timelock signers
Status: Mitigated by timelock, monitoring planned
M-3: Gas Griefing on Pull Payments#
Description: A malicious contract could consume excessive gas in receive() when claiming payments.
Impact: Legitimate users might face higher gas costs.
Current Mitigation:
- Gas limits on external calls
- Pull pattern means users control timing
Status: Low impact, mitigated
M-4: Sybil Resistance Limited#
Description: Users can create multiple identities by using different addresses.
Impact: Reputation gaming through multiple accounts.
Current Mitigation:
- Minimum stake requirement (0.01 ETH) per identity
- Economic cost for Sybil attacks
- Slashing for detected gaming
Future Mitigation:
- Soul-bound identity exploration
- KYC integration option
Status: Partially mitigated
Low Severity Issues#
L-1: Block Timestamp Dependency#
Description: Some operations use block.timestamp for timing.
Impact: Miners have ~15 second manipulation window.
Current Mitigation:
- No critical timing-dependent operations
- Timelock uses minimum delays, not exact
Status: Low impact, acceptable
L-2: Event Emission After State Change#
Description: Some events are emitted after state changes rather than before.
Impact: Indexers might see inconsistent state during reorgs.
Current Mitigation:
- Standard event emission pattern
- Wait for confirmations before indexing
Status: Standard practice, acceptable
L-3: No Withdrawal Deadline#
Description: Pending royalties have no expiration date.
Impact: Funds may remain unclaimed indefinitely.
Current Mitigation:
- Users can claim at any time
- No lock-up periods
Future Mitigation:
- Consider timeout with treasury fallback
Status: Design choice, monitoring recommended
L-4: Single Token Price#
Description: Each access token has a single fixed price.
Impact: No dynamic pricing based on demand.
Current Mitigation:
- Creators can create new tokens with different prices
- Token price is transparent
Status: Design choice, not an issue
Informational Issues#
I-1: Gas Optimization Opportunities#
Description: Several gas optimizations are possible:
- Unchecked arithmetic in loops
- Storage variable caching
- Shorter error messages
Impact: Higher gas costs for users.
Current Status: Security prioritized over optimization.
Future Plan: Optimize after security audit.
I-2: Limited Batch Sizes#
Description: Batch operations are limited to prevent exceeding block gas limit.
Impact: Large operations require multiple transactions.
Current Mitigation:
- Reasonable limits set (100 for mints)
- Multiple transactions supported
Status: Design limitation, acceptable
I-3: No Upgradability Pause#
Description: Upgrades cannot be paused separately from contract pause.
Impact: Pausing affects all operations, not just upgrades.
Current Mitigation:
- Timelock provides 72h review window
- Separate pause for regular operations
Status: Acceptable design
Resolved Issues#
R-1: Reentrancy in Withdrawal (Resolved)#
Original Issue: Withdrawal function was vulnerable to reentrancy.
Resolution: Added ReentrancyGuard and CEI pattern.
Commit: [reference to fix commit]
R-2: Missing Access Control (Resolved)#
Original Issue: Some admin functions lacked proper access control.
Resolution: Added Ownable2Step and role-based modifiers.
Commit: [reference to fix commit]
R-3: Flash Loan Vulnerability (Resolved)#
Original Issue: Critical operations could be exploited via flash loans.
Resolution: Implemented FlashLoanGuard with block-based protection.
Commit: [reference to fix commit]
R-4: Direct ETH Transfers (Resolved)#
Original Issue: Direct ETH transfers to user addresses could fail.
Resolution: Implemented pull payment pattern for all withdrawals.
Commit: [reference to fix commit]
Issue Tracking#
| ID | Severity | Status | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| H-1 | High | Accepted | Post-launch |
| M-1 | Medium | Accepted | Industry solution |
| M-2 | Medium | Mitigated | Q2 2025 |
| M-3 | Medium | Mitigated | - |
| M-4 | Medium | Partial | Q3 2025 |
| L-1 | Low | Accepted | - |
| L-2 | Low | Accepted | - |
| L-3 | Low | Monitoring | Q1 2025 |
| L-4 | Low | Design | - |
Reporting New Issues#
During audit, please report issues via:
- Secure document in shared folder
- Severity classification (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info)
- Proof of concept if applicable
- Recommended fix
We will:
- Acknowledge within 4 hours
- Triage within 24 hours
- Provide fix timeline within 48 hours