Intended use: multi-party search where any strict subset of the parties
can defect to a sub-agreement and secure a collective value that beats the
grand coalition's per-party allocation. DAO governance (§179.7.2),
multi-supplier procurement (§179.7.1), multi-party restorative circles
(§179.7.3).
Utility aggregation: characteristic-function game v(S) = collective
value coalition S can secure. Caller-supplied or derived by the kernel from
a candidate pool.
Accepted candidate contract:bestStableCandidate — the candidate whose
native utility vector is closest (in L1 norm of τ) to the least-core
allocation.
Allocation diagnostics: Shapley values (with CI for n > 7); core-empty /
core-non-empty verdict; least-core ε; blocking-coalition list with excess
values; bargaining-set membership of the imputation.
Side-payment vector: for the recommended candidate.
Uncertainty propagation: for Monte-Carlo sampled Shapley, the CI flows to
the workbench.
Exact Shapley enumeration is O(2^n); Monte-Carlo sampling required for
n > 7.
Least-core subgradient assumes linear v(S) extrapolation between samples;
non-monotone games may yield slow convergence.
Bargaining-set scan is exhaustive only up to bargainingSetScanDepth; deeper
objection-counter chains are not searched.
Side-payment generation assumes transferable utility; for
non-transferable-utility cases the recommended candidate is reported with
transferable_utility = false and side-payment is null.
Redline separation: per-party redlines block coalition formation that
would require the redlined party to consent; v(S) for such S is forced to
the BATNA floor.
No external subsidy:Σ τ = 0 is enforced; the kernel cannot invent
transfers from outside the party set.