Eve library

OpenRouter face-detection probe — 2026-09-10

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Evidence for 182.C.06.05 (detect faces, reject ambiguous identity packs) and for the decision NOT to unblock 182.C.06.06 the same way.

What was run#

Three fixtures were generated with google/gemini-3.1-flash-image — synthetic people, so no real person's likeness is used as a test asset — with intended counts of one, two, and zero. Two cheap vision models were then asked to count distinct visible faces and return strict JSON.

Fixture Intended gemini-2.5-flash-lite gemini-3.1-flash-lite
one_person 1 1 1
two_people 2 2 6
no_people 0 0 0

Cost per detection: $0.00019–$0.00030. Latency 1.7–9.0 s.

The disagreement is the finding, and neither model is wrong#

two-foreground-subjects-plus-bystanders.png was inspected directly. It contains two people in the foreground — the intended subjects — and roughly four more background office workers at desks, faces small but visible.

So gemini-2.5-flash-lite counted the subjects and gemini-3.1-flash-lite counted every face in frame. Both are correct readings of an under-specified question. The prompt asked for "faces clearly visible" and never said whether incidental bystanders count; the models resolved that ambiguity differently, and both reported confident: true while doing so.

Two conclusions follow, and they point in opposite directions:

  1. An exact face count from a VLM is not a stable measurement. It varies with the model and with how the question is phrased, and the model's own confidence flag does not distinguish the two readings. A gate keyed on "exactly N faces" would be keyed on an artefact of prompting.
  2. The ambiguity signal itself is robust. Both models agreed there was more than one face in the two-subject image and zero in the empty one. "Is this pack unambiguous?" is answerable; "how many faces exactly?" is not.

So 182.C.06.05 is implementable, but the gate keys on ambiguity, not on a count: more than one face detected → refuse until the creator maps each face to a cast member. That is what the task asks for, and it is the part that survives the disagreement.

The fixture is also the real-world case#

An uploaded reference shot in an office contains the subject and bystanders who never consented. That is synthetic-media:nonconsented-likeness territory (182.C.03.03), and it is the ordinary case rather than an edge case — which is why the pack cannot be accepted until a human says which face is the cast member.

Why this does NOT unblock 182.C.06.06#

182.C.06.06 asks for face visibility, pose yaw/pitch/roll, blur, exposure, occlusion, crop, resolution, full-body visibility and duplicate scores. A VLM returns a judgement, not a measurement: asked for a yaw angle it will produce a plausible number with no geometry behind it, and the probe above shows it will report confidence while doing so. Recording those as the reference-quality scores would be the fabricated-metric failure this phase exists to prevent (F-01). Blur and duplicate detection additionally need a decoded pixel buffer, which the BFF has no decoder for.

182.C.06.06 stays blocked-local, and so does the 182.C.19 identity gate — no VLM produces an ArcFace-class embedding, which is what the C4 cosine threshold compares.

The binding decision this leaves open#

Wiring a hosted detector means every uploaded reference face is sent to a third-party model at ingestion — copy 4 in the data-flow threat model, the copy revocation cannot recall. For references that go on to a generation the exposure already exists; for references the creator uploads and then discards, it is new.

The detector is therefore an injected port that is unconfigured by default. The capability is implemented and tested; binding it to a hosted model is a deployment decision, not a code decision.