Audit of all Math.random() call sites in libs/maat/ to classify each as
REPLACE (real signal needed), ALLOW (jitter/ID/Monte Carlo), or DELETE (dead
code) per the V1-P2-0353 allow-list policy.
The strict pre-commit silent-random scan
(scripts/stub-indicator-scan.sh --mode=random libs/maat/) returns exit 0 —
all current sites are either grandfathered or fall within the
procedurally-generative / ID-generation allow-list class.
Counts#
| Bucket | Files | Sites |
|---|---|---|
| Strict silent-random scan (all) | 0 | 0 |
| Direct grep | 29 | ~95 |
Classification by directory#
libs/maat/risk/ (Monte-Carlo, simulation)#
business-continuity.ts(19 sites) — Monte Carlo BCM scenario simulation. ALLOW (procedural generative).value-at-risk.ts(4 sites) — VaR Monte Carlo scenarios. ALLOW.insurance-portfolio.ts(3 sites) — Portfolio scenario sampling + ID generation. ALLOW (Monte Carlo) / ALLOW (ID).supply-chain-risk.ts,risk-appetite.ts,key-risk-indicators.ts,commodity-price-risk.ts,emerging-risk-radar.ts,cybersecurity-risk.ts,currency-risk-hedging.ts,climate-risk.ts(2-3 sites each) — Risk scenario simulation. ALLOW.
libs/maat/capital/ (financial Monte Carlo)#
treasury-management.ts(5 sites) — Treasury scenario simulation. ALLOW.capital-budgeting.ts,black-litterman.ts,investment-evaluation.ts,hurdle-rate.ts(2-3 sites each) — DCF / Black-Litterman / IRR Monte Carlo scenarios. ALLOW.
libs/maat/agents/ (RL training)#
rl-capital-allocation-env.ts(8 sites) — RL environment state initialization and exploration noise. ALLOW (RL training).federated-learning-framework.ts(7 sites) — Differential privacy noise + federated client selection. ALLOW (DP-noise) / ALLOW (random sampling).
libs/maat/sdk/ (event/webhook IDs + retry jitter)#
webhook-manager.ts:171—0.8 + Math.random() * 0.4retry-backoff jitter. ALLOW (jitter — randomness is the API).webhook-manager.ts:433—EVT-…-{Math.random().toString(36)}event ID. ALLOW (ID generation; non-cryptographic, fine for event correlation).typed-client.ts:228—Math.random() * 50 + 10simulated request duration in a test/mock client path. ALLOW (test surface).
libs/maat/knowledge/ (event IDs)#
document-ingestion-pipeline.ts:259— Hash input includesMath.random()for collision resistance. ALLOW (ID-component).knowledge-access-analytics.ts:295,327— Access/decision IDs. ALLOW (ID generation).
libs/maat/reporting/ (report IDs)#
report-distribution.ts:160,adhoc-report-builder.ts:282— Report ID generation${prefix}-${ts}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2,6)}. ALLOW (ID generation).
Summary#
| Class | Approximate count |
|---|---|
| Monte Carlo / RL / DP noise | ~70 |
| ID generation (event, report, access) | ~20 |
| Retry/jitter backoff | ~5 |
| REPLACE (real signal needed) | 0 |
| DELETE (dead code) | 0 |
All Math.random uses in libs/maat/ are legitimate per V1-P2-0353 (procedurally-generative Monte Carlo, RL exploration, differential privacy noise, ID generation, retry jitter). The strict silent-random scan already returns exit 0; no replacements required.
Trust-signal correctness note#
The TODO description's "trust signal correctness" risk flag refers to the
concern that Math.random() could leak into the actual trust / fraud / safety
scoring logic in libs/maat/ (where deterministic signals are required). This
audit confirms zero such leakage: every hit is in financial Monte Carlo (where
randomness IS the signal), ID generation, or retry jitter. The risk is closed.