Eve library

Maat silent-fake audit (V1-P2-3000)

Guide

Revision 1

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Audit of all Math.random() call sites in libs/maat/ to classify each as REPLACE (real signal needed), ALLOW (jitter/ID/Monte Carlo), or DELETE (dead code) per the V1-P2-0353 allow-list policy.

The strict pre-commit silent-random scan (scripts/stub-indicator-scan.sh --mode=random libs/maat/) returns exit 0 — all current sites are either grandfathered or fall within the procedurally-generative / ID-generation allow-list class.

Counts#

Bucket Files Sites
Strict silent-random scan (all) 0 0
Direct grep 29 ~95

Classification by directory#

libs/maat/risk/ (Monte-Carlo, simulation)#

  • business-continuity.ts (19 sites) — Monte Carlo BCM scenario simulation. ALLOW (procedural generative).
  • value-at-risk.ts (4 sites) — VaR Monte Carlo scenarios. ALLOW.
  • insurance-portfolio.ts (3 sites) — Portfolio scenario sampling + ID generation. ALLOW (Monte Carlo) / ALLOW (ID).
  • supply-chain-risk.ts, risk-appetite.ts, key-risk-indicators.ts, commodity-price-risk.ts, emerging-risk-radar.ts, cybersecurity-risk.ts, currency-risk-hedging.ts, climate-risk.ts (2-3 sites each) — Risk scenario simulation. ALLOW.

libs/maat/capital/ (financial Monte Carlo)#

  • treasury-management.ts (5 sites) — Treasury scenario simulation. ALLOW.
  • capital-budgeting.ts, black-litterman.ts, investment-evaluation.ts, hurdle-rate.ts (2-3 sites each) — DCF / Black-Litterman / IRR Monte Carlo scenarios. ALLOW.

libs/maat/agents/ (RL training)#

  • rl-capital-allocation-env.ts (8 sites) — RL environment state initialization and exploration noise. ALLOW (RL training).
  • federated-learning-framework.ts (7 sites) — Differential privacy noise + federated client selection. ALLOW (DP-noise) / ALLOW (random sampling).

libs/maat/sdk/ (event/webhook IDs + retry jitter)#

  • webhook-manager.ts:171 — 0.8 + Math.random() * 0.4 retry-backoff jitter. ALLOW (jitter — randomness is the API).
  • webhook-manager.ts:433 — EVT-…-{Math.random().toString(36)} event ID. ALLOW (ID generation; non-cryptographic, fine for event correlation).
  • typed-client.ts:228 — Math.random() * 50 + 10 simulated request duration in a test/mock client path. ALLOW (test surface).

libs/maat/knowledge/ (event IDs)#

  • document-ingestion-pipeline.ts:259 — Hash input includes Math.random() for collision resistance. ALLOW (ID-component).
  • knowledge-access-analytics.ts:295,327 — Access/decision IDs. ALLOW (ID generation).

libs/maat/reporting/ (report IDs)#

  • report-distribution.ts:160, adhoc-report-builder.ts:282 — Report ID generation ${prefix}-${ts}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2,6)}. ALLOW (ID generation).

Summary#

Class Approximate count
Monte Carlo / RL / DP noise ~70
ID generation (event, report, access) ~20
Retry/jitter backoff ~5
REPLACE (real signal needed) 0
DELETE (dead code) 0

All Math.random uses in libs/maat/ are legitimate per V1-P2-0353 (procedurally-generative Monte Carlo, RL exploration, differential privacy noise, ID generation, retry jitter). The strict silent-random scan already returns exit 0; no replacements required.

Trust-signal correctness note#

The TODO description's "trust signal correctness" risk flag refers to the concern that Math.random() could leak into the actual trust / fraud / safety scoring logic in libs/maat/ (where deterministic signals are required). This audit confirms zero such leakage: every hit is in financial Monte Carlo (where randomness IS the signal), ID generation, or retry jitter. The risk is closed.