# OPS-001 — V1 production-topology verification

Status: **repository topology, failure domains, and recovery objectives
verified; live-production topology and second-domain failover blocked on
operator evidence**.

The machine-verifiable record is
[`OPS-001/repository-topology.json`](OPS-001/repository-topology.json). It was
generated from source commit `f6571b0089edb0fd374c4cf8a780ae9a7f1ea0dc` and has
payload SHA-256
`9bbc8e1cc87f75321c27fe3dc62cb46d8f630898988cf5c6feb43bf24a8d49a1`.

## Requirement disposition

| OPS-001 requirement                             | Verdict | Evidence                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| ----------------------------------------------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Generate a canonical repository topology record | Pass    | The record hashes 25 canonical compose, Caddy, workflow, deployment, backup/restore, cycle-driver, environment-surface, README, generator, and policy sources. CI and the local verifier reject source, inventory, route, volume, workflow, claim, or checksum drift.                                           |
| Probe authorized live production                | Blocked | No authorized target identity, production hostname, SSH/provider credential, or monitoring endpoint is available in the repository or execution environment. The checked-in production Caddy site is named `production.caddy.disabled`, so the active `*.caddy` import does not load it. No live claim is made. |
| Enumerate shared failure domains                | Pass    | Seven explicit domains cover the host, rootful Docker daemon, kernel/disk/IP, single data instances, single edge, process-local cycle driver, and same-disk backup placement.                                                                                                                                   |
| Define state-class objectives                   | Pass    | Nine state classes define RPO, RTO, availability, capacity, maintenance, recovery procedure, and owner. They are objectives, not claims that production currently meets them.                                                                                                                                   |
| Implement and prove a second failure domain     | Blocked | Canonical sources declare one host and no replica/quorum/traffic-failover path. No authenticated failover record exists. Whole-box backup suggestions are not treated as resilience.                                                                                                                            |

Future evidence is intentionally separated from repository inference. An
authorized probe must be recorded at
`evidence/v1-v9/OPS-001/live-production-probe.json`; authenticated cross-domain
failover evidence must be recorded at
`evidence/v1-v9/OPS-001/second-failure-domain-proof.json`. The generator
validates their schemas and refuses to promote either requirement without
complete proof.

## Declared topology

- One Hetzner CCX23 is the shared host for the declared staging stack and the
  optional production stack. Both share one kernel, NVMe disk, public IP,
  rootful Docker daemon, and Caddy edge.
- Compose declares 26 services: 20 application images, a GHCR-built off-box
  backup worker, PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO, the one-shot MinIO initializer, and
  local PostgreSQL backup. Steady state has 6,400 MiB of limits; the initializer
  adds a 64 MiB startup ceiling, making the literal all-service total 6,464 MiB.
- Six local named volumes hold PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO, content-service run
  state, Psyche computer-use snapshots, and backup-worker scratch state.
  Run/review/publication snapshots used by the BFF are placed in the single
  PostgreSQL instance.
- One Caddy container exposes ten host routes on 80/443. PostgreSQL alone has a
  host-published application port and it is bound to loopback.
- The deployment workflow builds immutable images in GHCR, rsyncs the bundle,
  and invokes the environment-locked SSH deployment path. This is a deployment
  mechanism, not a redundant runtime control plane.
- The BFF process starts its autonomy cycle driver by default when a director is
  bound. No distributed lease is declared; a future secondary must keep
  `OSHUN_AUTONOMY_AUTOCYCLE=0` until promotion or implement leader election, or
  multiple BFFs can schedule duplicate cycles.
- PostgreSQL dumps cover every non-template database, carry SHA-256 and
  metadata, retain 14 days by default, and run at startup plus cron. A
  disabled-by-default restic worker now declares encrypted independent-domain
  coverage for those dumps, Redis, MinIO API exports, file run/snapshot state,
  and configuration. This is implementation evidence only: no deployed receipt,
  remote retention proof, or clean-host drill is claimed.

Declared external dependencies are Hetzner host/storage/network, DNS and ACME,
GitHub Actions/GHCR, an operator-supplied off-box backup repository, OpenRouter,
optional RunPod GPU inference, the currently external/missing Metis Python
backend, and an undeclared monitoring plane. The record keeps these repository
observations distinct from any future live probe.

## Failure-domain consequences

| Shared domain                     | Consequence                                                                                                            |
| --------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| CCX23 host                        | One host loss stops BFF/director, all other runtime, every data instance, backups, and edge together.                  |
| Docker daemon/kernel/disk/IP      | A daemon, kernel, disk, or network failure crosses both environment projects and all state classes.                    |
| PostgreSQL/Redis/MinIO singletons | There is no declared replica, quorum, promotion, or fencing mechanism for authoritative, operational, or object state. |
| Caddy edge                        | One container/address/certificate-state path serves every public route.                                                |
| BFF cycle driver                  | BFF loss stops scheduling; naive active-active BFF scale-out risks multiple schedulers.                                |
| Backup colocation                 | Whole-box loss removes local dumps/receipts; the remote snapshot survives only after enablement and a passing receipt. |

The full recovery-objective matrix is canonical in the JSON policy and record.
The most stringent targets are Redis operational state at 1-minute RPO/15-minute
RTO, PostgreSQL authoritative state at 5-minute RPO/30-minute RTO, and edge
routing at 15-minute RTO/99.95% monthly availability. Each target also states
capacity headroom, maintenance constraints, a recovery procedure, and ownership.

## Verification

The focused gate runs eight adversarial tests and a source-sensitive record
check:

```text
pnpm run verify:operations:v1-topology-record
  node:test: 8/8 passed
  record: 26 services, 10 routes
  live topology: blocked
  second failure domain: blocked

pnpm exec eslint scripts/operations/v1-topology-record.mjs \
  scripts/operations/v1-topology-record.test.mjs --no-ignore --max-warnings=0
  passed

pnpm exec prettier --check <OPS-001 changed files>
  passed

git diff --check
  passed
```

The tests remove/rename a compose service, move a durable-volume consumer,
change the GHCR workflow inventory, mutate a Caddy upstream, tamper with the
record, and change one byte of canonical source. They also assert that same-host
backup and repository-only evidence remain blocked rather than becoming false
live/resilience claims.
