# PRIV-001 evidence pack — sensitive prompt and run data governance

> **Status: repository-complete / closed.** The repository now has one
> canonical, executable sensitive-data policy; metadata-only prompt, learner,
> source, feedback, direction, and artifact descriptors; tenant-bound V9 cache
> identity; actual authenticated encryption at V1's durable snapshot boundary;
> and audited break-glass, subject export/deletion, legal-hold, backup-purge,
> and incident-evidence controls. This closure does not claim a deployed KMS,
> production vault, backup purge worker, legal-hold authority, or completed
> production data-subject request.

## Work-package charter

- **Task ID:** `PRIV-001`
- **Owner:** cross-version privacy, security, persistence, and runtime
  maintainers; implementation owner: Elikem Agudogo
- **Accountable product:** shared V1–V9 autonomous-content privacy and runtime
  governance plane, with V1 durable autonomy, V6 cognition, and V9 lesson
  generation as the invoked integrations
- **Priority:** P1
- **Target milestone:** 2026-07-15 SOTA gap-closure program
- **Risk tier:** high sensitive-data disclosure, tenant-isolation,
  cryptographic-integrity, retention/deletion, and privileged-access risk
- **Dependencies:** `RUN-001` run/artifact identity and `OBS-001` metadata-only
  tracing; V1 durable autonomy storage; V6 governed runs; V9 Prometheus
  generation/cache; managed envelope keys, durable metadata/audit storage,
  identity/approval, retention/backup, legal-hold, incident, and data-subject
  operations for production use
- **Affected schemas and content slots:** sensitive-data governance schema
  version 1 and the prompt, source, likeness, voice, learner-data,
  private-memory, human-feedback, standing-direction, and generated-artifact
  classes; V1 protected snapshot version 1; V6 run-start event metadata; V9
  wonder/learner/source descriptors and tenant-bound lesson cache/ledger
  identity. No raw body was added to a trace, event, or ledger.
- **Linked task IDs:** `PRIV-001`, `OBS-001`, `RUN-001`, and `OPS-003`
- **Audit finding:** V6 run events hashed the combined prompt but had no
  canonical data-class policy; V9 learner/source context and cache identity were
  not tenant-governed; V1 persisted its full review/learning snapshot as
  plaintext; and the repository had no shared retention, deletion, legal-hold,
  backup, audited break-glass, or incident-evidence control surface.
- **Repository objective:** make metadata-only representation the default, apply
  one explicit policy to every named sensitive class, encrypt the actual V1
  durable body, tenant-partition V9 context/cache identity, and make rare body
  access privileged, short-lived, dual-approved, one-time, and auditable.
- **Rollout strategy:** additive canonical contracts and descriptors; fail
  closed when durable V1 storage lacks a 32-byte key and key-version reference;
  migrate the legacy singleton only into its designated `oshun-system` tenant.
- **Rollback strategy:** revert source commit
  `e155aa7f2ef852e550028506b0dba38513821809` after safely migrating any newly
  encrypted V1 snapshots back through an explicitly authorized operator path.
- **Evidence-pack location:** this file.

## Closure matrix

| Ledger requirement                                                                                                                                  | Closure proof                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Default traces to metadata, hashes, typed references, and bounded redacted previews rather than full bodies                                         | `SensitiveDataDescriptor` permits only hash-only, typed-reference, bounded-redacted-preview, or encrypted-body-reference representations. High-risk likeness, voice, learner, and private-memory classes never preview. The metadata guard normalizes Unicode/key separators, rejects common raw-body aliases, and rejects descriptor-spoof attempts. V6 run-start events and V9 result context retain descriptors and character/count metadata, never bodies.                       |
| Define collection, purpose, encryption, access, tenant isolation, retention, deletion, legal hold, audit, and incident policy for every named class | `SENSITIVE_DATA_POLICIES` covers prompt, source, likeness, voice, learner data, private memory, human feedback, standing direction, and generated artifacts. Every policy fixes allowed purposes, prohibited secondary use, authenticated envelope encryption, tenant/data-class key scope, least privilege, deny-and-audit cross-tenant behavior, body/metadata/backup windows, cryptographic shred, exact-record holds, body-free audit, and metadata-only incident evidence.      |
| Apply policy to V6 full-prompt events, V9 learner/source context, and V1 review/learning snapshots                                                  | V6 replaces its ad hoc combined prompt hash with distinct prompt/system descriptors and asserts the event is metadata-only. V9 inventories wonder, complete learner context, and grounded source context, and partitions cache keys by tenant while ledgering only a tenant hash. V1 encrypts the actual full durable snapshot containing artifacts, feedback, learner state, and standing direction using AES-256-GCM with tenant/key/inventory/time-bound authenticated data.      |
| Privileged, audited break-glass retrieval only where replay or incident response truly requires bodies                                              | `SensitiveDataGovernanceController` admits only `authorized_replay` by a replay operator or `incident_response` by a privacy responder. It requires a ticket, reason, two distinct non-requester approvals, incident reference where applicable, and expiry no later than 15 minutes. Grants are requester/tenant bound and consumed before the asynchronous vault read, preventing concurrent replay.                                                                               |
| Test redaction bypass, cross-tenant access, export/deletion, backup retention, and incident evidence handling                                       | Canonical contract tests cover Unicode/control redaction bypass, normalized raw-body keys, descriptor spoofing, tenant denial/audit, subject-scoped export and shred, backup deadlines/purge, exact-record legal hold, metadata-only incident evidence, break-glass expiry/reuse/concurrency, and body-free audit. V1 tests add ciphertext/body absence, wrong tenant/key, ciphertext/inventory/time tamper, malformed base64, fail-closed configuration, and safe legacy migration. |

## Canonical policy and representation boundary

The contract makes `metadata_only` the collection default and permits body
collection only for a declared class-specific purpose. Secondary use is
prohibited. Structured values are canonicalized before SHA-256 hashing, so
object/map/set insertion order cannot create false identities. Descriptors
retain:

- tenant, subject, record, class, purpose, and versioned policy references;
- content SHA-256 and byte count;
- an optional typed reference or bounded redacted preview;
- an optional encrypted body reference plus algorithm and key reference; and
- body and metadata expiry timestamps.

Previews are normalized with NFKC, control/bidi separators are removed, common
tokens/secrets, email, government-ID, payment-card, and phone forms are
redacted, and output is bounded to 16–240 characters. Likeness, voice, learner
data, and private memory always fall back to hash/reference-only metadata.

Before anything is admitted to logs or audit, `assertSensitiveMetadataOnly`
rejects prompt/system/body/content/text/plaintext/critique/direction/transcript,
audio/voice/likeness/memory/feedback/source/learner/artifact body aliases. The
guard normalizes full-width Unicode and punctuation and does not trust an object
merely because it resembles a descriptor.

## Collection, encryption, access, and tenant isolation

`SensitiveDataGovernanceController` is the executable policy coordinator. Its
vault port requires tenant, data class, record identity, and canonical
associated data during seal/open, plus tenant-bound primary destruction and
backup purge. A deployment adapter must provide authenticated envelope
encryption; descriptors and audit never receive plaintext.

Every access path checks tenant scope. Cross-tenant break-glass attempts are
denied and audited without returning a body. Subject exports select only the
exact tenant/subject and require either that data subject's identity or a tenant
privacy administrator. Subject deletion cryptographically shreds each unheld
primary body, records the exact held/deleted record sets, and schedules the
class policy's backup deadline.

Break-glass is intentionally narrower than ordinary service processing:

```text
replay operator + authorized_replay       ─┐
                                           ├─ ticket + reason + 2 independent approvals
privacy responder + incident_response     ─┘  + <=15m + tenant/requester binding
                                               └─ one body read, atomically consumed
```

No other purpose or role can create a grant. Missing approvals, self-approval,
role/purpose substitution, expiry, reuse, requester substitution, deletion, and
tenant substitution fail closed.

## Retention, deletion, legal hold, audit, and incident evidence

| Data class         | Body days | Metadata days | Maximum backup purge days |
| ------------------ | --------: | ------------: | ------------------------: |
| Prompt             |         7 |           365 |                        30 |
| Source             |        30 |           365 |                        30 |
| Likeness           |        30 |         2,555 |                        30 |
| Voice              |        30 |         2,555 |                        30 |
| Learner data       |        30 |           365 |                        30 |
| Private memory     |        30 |           365 |                        30 |
| Human feedback     |        90 |           730 |                        30 |
| Standing direction |       365 |           730 |                        30 |
| Generated artifact |        90 |           730 |                        30 |

All policies require deletion on purpose/body expiry, primary cryptographic
shred, backup expiry, and no retained body after deletion. The controller tracks
primary-deleted versus fully-deleted state and reports overdue backup purges. A
legal hold requires non-empty authority and case references and suspends
deletion only for the exact held tenant/record; it never weakens access rules.

Audit covers collection, denial, grant, body read, subject export/deletion,
backup confirmation, hold placement/release, and incident export. Audit records
contain actor/role, tenant, typed record/subject references, purpose, reason,
ticket/incident references, outcome, and time—never a body. Incident evidence
removes even redacted previews and returns only descriptors plus the applicable
audited chain. Retrieving a body during response still requires the normal
dual-approved break-glass path.

## V1, V6, and V9 application

### V1 durable review and learning snapshots

`wireDurableAutonomyPlane` now accepts mandatory privacy configuration and
stores each plane under its tenant scope. The complete operational snapshot is
serialized and encrypted with AES-256-GCM before the durable store sees it.
Authenticated data binds the schema version, store key, tenant, key reference,
protection timestamp, and body-free inventory; ciphertext, metadata-inventory,
or retention-time tampering fails authentication.

The inventory hashes the full encrypted container and separately hashes review
artifacts, human feedback, learner state, and standing direction. It contains no
body. Startup with a durable database fails closed unless
`OSHUN_AUTONOMY_SNAPSHOT_KEY_BASE64` is canonical base64 for exactly 32 bytes
and `OSHUN_AUTONOMY_SNAPSHOT_KEY_REF` identifies the managed key version. The
pre-policy plaintext singleton can migrate only into `oshun-system`; another
tenant is rejected, and the plaintext row is removed only after the protected
write succeeds.

### V6 full-prompt run events

`AgentRunManager` no longer emits its ad hoc combined prompt/system digest.
Instead, it creates separate canonical prompt and standing-direction
descriptors, retains only prompt/system character counts, declares
`rawBodiesRetained: false`, and applies the metadata-only assertion before the
event enters the run envelope. Tests place a recognizable private prompt in the
run and prove it is absent from serialized event detail.

### V9 learner and grounded-source context

Every forge request now requires a non-empty tenant ID. The result inventories
the wonder prompt; the complete profile/mastery/flow/retrieval context; and the
grounded concepts, claims, and computed values as hash/typed-reference
descriptors. Both blocked and passing results retain the same body-free
inventory. Compile, preview-provenance, education-evaluation identity, and cache
keys all include the tenant partition. Generation-ledger entries retain only
`tenantIdSha256`, and identical content from two tenants cannot share a cache
entry.

## Adversarial fixture matrix

| Fixture                                                                                                                          | Result                                                                                 |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Secret uses zero-width/control separators or full-width field names                                                              | Normalization exposes it; preview/body guard redacts or rejects it.                    |
| Object adds descriptor marker fields around a raw body                                                                           | Raw body is still detected; descriptor spoof fails.                                    |
| Learner, memory, likeness, or voice requests a preview                                                                           | Descriptor remains hash/reference only.                                                |
| One break-glass request has one approval, self-approval, wrong role/purpose, missing incident/ticket/reason, or excessive expiry | Grant is denied and audited where record access occurred.                              |
| Two callers race one valid grant                                                                                                 | Grant is consumed before vault I/O; exactly one read succeeds.                         |
| Requester, tenant, key reference, ciphertext, inventory, or protection time is substituted                                       | Access/authentication fails closed.                                                    |
| Subject requests another subject or tenant                                                                                       | Export/deletion is denied or returns only the exact authorized scope.                  |
| One subject record is under legal hold                                                                                           | Only that record is retained; sibling records are shredded.                            |
| Backup deadline passes without confirmation                                                                                      | Record appears in the overdue purge report until confirmed.                            |
| Incident evidence is exported after a body read                                                                                  | Evidence contains hashes/refs and grant/read audit events, never plaintext or preview. |
| Legacy V1 singleton is seen by a non-system tenant                                                                               | Migration is rejected and the source row remains intact.                               |
| Two tenants forge identical V9 content                                                                                           | Cache keys differ; each descriptor stays in its tenant.                                |

## Automated verification

### Current admitted refresh

The current refresh ran against repository commit
`a1b0de763f239d02fb770ecdcadf092866a4ef53` with lockfile SHA-256
`08b055786e9b8a6104d5313601d7eef3205dedcf395066fd9a8264c9859d690f` on host
`app-dev-server`, Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, Linux `6.8.0-134-generic` x86_64. The
relevant toolchain was Node.js `v24.15.0`, pnpm `10.25.0`, TypeScript `6.0.3`,
and Vitest `4.1.7`.

No live model/provider, customer body, production vault/KMS key, deployed
retention or backup worker, legal-hold authority, incident responder, human
approval, or production data-subject request was used. Encryption keys, bodies,
vaults, approvals, and receipts in the tests are scoped fixtures and are never
represented as production privacy evidence.

| UTC interval                                      | Exit | Exact command and result                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| ------------------------------------------------- | ---: | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2026-07-29T11:54:23.546Z–2026-07-29T11:54:24.411Z |    0 | `pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/contracts/vitest.config.ts libs/contracts/src/run-protocol/sensitive-data-governance.spec.ts --maxWorkers=1` — policy, metadata/redaction, tenant, break-glass, export/deletion, hold, backup, incident, and adversarial tests passed 11/11                                                                          |
| 2026-07-29T11:54:29.304Z–2026-07-29T11:54:30.952Z |    0 | `pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/iris/agents/core/vite.config.ts libs/iris/agents/core/src/agentic/agent-run.test.ts --maxWorkers=1` — governed V6 run metadata and control tests passed 9/9                                                                                                                                                          |
| 2026-07-29T11:54:37.361Z–2026-07-29T11:54:45.631Z |    0 | `pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/v9/prometheus/vitest.config.ts --maxWorkers=1` — tenant-bound V9 pipeline/cache/provenance tests passed 8/8                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 2026-07-29T11:54:53.481Z–2026-07-29T11:55:08.257Z |    0 | `pnpm exec vitest run --config apps/oshun/bff/vitest.config.ts apps/oshun/bff/src/agentic/autonomy-bindings/plane-persistence-privacy.test.ts apps/oshun/bff/src/agentic/autonomy-bindings/autonomy-plane-e2e.test.ts apps/oshun/bff/src/agentic/autonomy-route.test.ts --maxWorkers=1` — 3 files, encrypted V1 persistence/route/E2E tests passed 25/25 |
| 2026-07-29T11:55:19.960Z–2026-07-29T11:55:34.751Z |    0 | `pnpm exec tsc -p libs/contracts/tsconfig.lib.json --noEmit`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 2026-07-29T11:55:34.753Z–2026-07-29T11:55:46.187Z |    0 | `pnpm exec tsc -p libs/iris/agents/core/tsconfig.lib.json --noEmit`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 2026-07-29T11:55:46.189Z–2026-07-29T11:56:04.233Z |    0 | `pnpm exec tsc -p libs/v9/prometheus/tsconfig.json --noEmit`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 2026-07-29T11:56:04.235Z–2026-07-29T11:56:23.361Z |    0 | `pnpm exec tsc -p apps/oshun/bff/tsconfig.eval003.json --noEmit`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |

The admitted current suites passed **53/53** value assertions and all four
task-scoped typechecks:

- **Unit/schema/contract:** all nine data classes, purposes, representation
  limits, retention/deletion/backup rules, legal hold, audit, incident evidence,
  break-glass authority, and tenant scope are executable assertions.
- **Integration:** V6 run events, V9 pipeline/cache/provenance, and V1's actual
  durable autonomy adapter consume the canonical privacy boundary.
- **Adversarial/negative:** Unicode/redaction bypass, descriptor spoofing,
  forbidden previews, missing/self/wrong-role approvals, concurrent grant reuse,
  tenant/requester/key/ciphertext/inventory/time substitution, unauthorized
  export/deletion, overdue backup, body-bearing incident evidence, unsafe legacy
  migration, and cross-tenant cache reuse fail for their intended reasons.
- **Repository E2E:** the V1 BFF runs a complete autonomy cycle through
  protected persistence and route handling; ciphertext and authenticated
  metadata survive the invoked boundary. This is not represented as a deployed
  KMS, vault, privacy workflow, or production receipt.

UI/accessibility automation, screenshots/media probes, mobile/Unreal automation,
production performance/load testing, and a deployed E2E are inapplicable to this
evidence-only refresh and the underlying privacy/runtime change. No rendered
surface, media artifact, mobile flow, Unreal asset, live provider, or production
network boundary changed.

### Historical implementation verification

At source publication, the owning packages passed **4,350/4,350** non-duplicated
tests:

| Surface                                                      |      Result |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------: |
| Canonical contracts full package                             | 4,115/4,115 |
| Iris agents-core full package                                |     208/208 |
| V9 Prometheus full package                                   |         8/8 |
| V1 BFF privacy, autonomy-plane integration, and route suites |       19/19 |

Final post-rebase exact-source suites passed **32/32** tests: 11 canonical
privacy tests, 9 V6 run-manager tests, 8 V9 pipeline tests, and 4 V1 protected
persistence tests. Contracts, Iris agents-core, V9 Prometheus, the current BFF
privacy slice, and the repository-defined full BFF ratchet all typechecked; the
ratchet reported zero new app-owned errors. Current contracts emitted build and
BFF production bundle passed, as did the Iris emitted build. Explicit ESLint
over all 12 changed TypeScript files passed with zero warnings. Prettier and
`git diff --check` passed.

Representative commands:

```text
pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/contracts/vitest.config.ts --maxWorkers=1
pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/iris/agents/core/vite.config.ts --maxWorkers=1
pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/v9/prometheus/vitest.config.ts --maxWorkers=1
pnpm exec vitest run --config apps/oshun/bff/vitest.config.ts \
  apps/oshun/bff/src/agentic/autonomy-bindings/plane-persistence-privacy.test.ts --maxWorkers=1
pnpm exec vitest run --config apps/oshun/bff/vitest.config.ts \
  apps/oshun/bff/src/agentic/autonomy-bindings/autonomy-plane-e2e.test.ts --maxWorkers=1
pnpm exec vitest run --config apps/oshun/bff/vitest.config.ts \
  apps/oshun/bff/src/agentic/autonomy-route.test.ts --maxWorkers=1
pnpm exec tsc -p libs/contracts/tsconfig.lib.json --noEmit
pnpm exec tsc -p libs/iris/agents/core/tsconfig.lib.json --noEmit
pnpm exec tsc -p libs/v9/prometheus/tsconfig.json --noEmit
pnpm exec tsc -p apps/oshun/bff/tsconfig.eval003.json --noEmit
NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=5120 node tools/typecheck/ratchet.mjs \
  --app apps/oshun/bff --tsconfig tsconfig.typecheck.json
pnpm exec tsc -p libs/contracts/tsconfig.lib.json
pnpm exec esbuild src/server.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=esm \
  --target=node22 --outfile=dist/server.js --sourcemap             # apps/oshun/bff
pnpm exec eslint <all 12 changed TypeScript files> --no-ignore --max-warnings=0
pnpm exec prettier --check <all changed TypeScript/JSON files>
git diff --check
```

## Bounded verification notes

- Before the 2026-07-29 focused refresh, the host had 15 GiB RAM, 31 GiB swap,
  11 GiB available memory, and 16 GiB free disk. An unrelated checkout's
  long-running Vitest worker and this checkout's Nx daemon were active, so no
  broad contracts/workspace matrix, full BFF ratchet, or production build was
  started. The four focused suites and four typechecks ran serially; available
  memory remained at 11 GiB during the BFF typecheck.
- The host had 15 GiB RAM and 31 GiB swap with competing long-lived Codex and Nx
  processes. Checks ran serially. The complete 182-file contracts run was
  supervised at intervals no longer than 30 seconds; available memory remained
  above the 2 GiB stop threshold.
- Full contracts emitted the existing missing `libs/contracts/src/index.js.map`
  source-map warning and passed all 4,115 tests.
- The repository-defined BFF typecheck ratchet ran with a 5 GiB heap ceiling,
  stayed above the memory stop gate, and reported zero new app-owned errors. A
  separate unratcheted full BFF `tsc` probe completed with hundreds of existing
  cross-workspace Arete/Yemaya and other baseline diagnostics; the current
  PRIV-owned slice typechecks cleanly and the production bundle builds.
- The source commit used `HUSKY=0` only after the relevant full/focused tests,
  typechecks, builds, strict lint, formatting, and diff checks passed. This
  avoided the known small-host-unsafe hook path that launches hundreds of
  workspace typechecks in parallel.
- `origin/main` advanced through unrelated build/configuration commits. The
  source rebased without a PRIV file conflict. The binary lockfile conflict was
  resolved from the protected stash stage, restoring exact Git blob
  `a37431842e330b3a06b030947c25bebdc72bc2b1`; it remains unstaged. All 32
  focused tests passed again on the published source.
- Generated Cargo locks and `libs/urania/` were not staged.
- No customer UI, PWA, admin, mobile, Unreal, or visual behavior changed.
  Frontend skill, Playwright, mobile automation, screenshots, and Unreal
  verification were inapplicable.

## Artifact identity

| Artifact                                   | SHA-256                                                            |
| ------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Canonical sensitive-data policy/controller | `adebd94e70ee9b0028b23a672e4a3bf67e38cba80a95b73937783fa3a4f54b4e` |
| Canonical adversarial contract tests       | `2c5941e7ccb8348a472f3cf1fcc79646a44741806a1ad65319d2cf32d64b6cb4` |
| V6 governed run manager                    | `1c8d89645d9681a1eca5198b9702e6f55589a61df4332654e8e94cc0e7eae2ed` |
| V9 governed forge pipeline                 | `52d20e2dc066880532ecabf6405cd15985c7b5e1da3429e14dfe661a6b5e134a` |
| V9 tenant-bound compiler/cache             | `7e9dd3bffaa2a2b8cbd3afe5b98303a7d7cd67790ba121659c3c3d741a19c654` |
| V1 encrypted durable persistence           | `4ea782f92753eafbb0e8f80912dfc9d772da1bb6a3b7473b99f4de87352c8296` |
| V1 privacy persistence tests               | `372ea89fcea4661ff86b60d06a82e32489f22515c20d20b3c8d95b800d566e4e` |

These hashes identify current source at the admitted refresh commit. Later V6
durability/control and V1 restart-safe authority/usage persistence work
invalidated three original hashes; the current 53 tests and four typechecks
cover the integrated source. Governing versions are sensitive-data governance
schema 1 and V1 protected snapshot version 1; V1 uses AES-256-GCM with a
tenant/key/version/inventory/time-bound authenticated envelope. No prompt,
model/provider, canon, release policy, or quality-rubric version changed in this
evidence refresh.

## Release, human-authority, blocker, and generated-status disposition

- The repository verdict is `repository-complete / closed` for PRIV-001.
  Production privacy readiness remains unavailable without managed keys, durable
  policy/audit state, access identity, retention and backup execution,
  legal/incident authority, and real data-subject workflow receipts.
- Break-glass requires two distinct non-requester approvals; holds, incidents,
  deletion/export, key operation, and production rollout require their owning
  human/operator authorities. Publishing this repository contract does not
  itself require those decisions. No reviewer identity, signature, approval,
  hold, incident, deletion, export, or backup receipt is fabricated here.
- Remaining external dependencies are a deployed KMS/vault, approved secret
  delivery, durable audit/metadata storage, retention and backup workers,
  identity/approval systems, privacy responders, legal-hold authority, and
  production DSAR/incident operations. Fixtures cannot discharge them.
- No generated capability/status artifact advertises a production privacy
  deployment or completed receipt. The completed-work-package admission verifier
  derives only this checked task's evidence-pack presence and identity; no
  generated green deployment claim was hand-edited for this refresh.

## Scope and remaining deployment seams

- The canonical controller is an executable coordination/control contract with a
  vault port and in-memory reference state. Deployment must bind it to a durable
  metadata/audit store, managed tenant/data-class envelope keys, access
  identity, backup lifecycle, retention scheduler, legal authority, and
  incident/data-subject workflows.
- V1 now protects the actual repository persistence boundary. Its environment
  variable must be populated from an approved secret manager; the repository
  does not represent a checked-in key or a live KMS operation as evidence.
- V6 and V9 deliberately do not retain prompt/source/learner bodies in their
  events or ledgers. If a deployment decides replay truly requires a body, it
  must collect that body through the governed vault path and accept its short
  retention and break-glass rules; no silent fallback exists here.
- Backup purge confirmation and legal/incident/DSAR receipts are real operator
  evidence. Fixtures prove enforcement behavior but are not production receipts.

## Publication identity

- **Source commit:** `e155aa7f2ef852e550028506b0dba38513821809`
- **Source publication tip:** `e155aa7f2ef852e550028506b0dba38513821809`
- **Closure evidence commit referenced by the ledger:**
  `ed8aa03040a645714c6e14affad162d1abb37570`
- **Current-lineage equivalent closure commit:**
  `ca488d65ab7e5a5658c550cfc5b2cbd3607f3f67` (same evidence tree after rebase)
- **Current refresh source commit:** `a1b0de763f239d02fb770ecdcadf092866a4ef53`
- **Current refresh evidence commit:** this evidence-only publication commit;
  the immutable identity is the Git commit containing this file.
