Historical task source. The Eve task board holds current task state.
Status date: 2026-07-14. This is an engineering control-to-evidence map, not a certification, legal opinion, HIPAA risk analysis, or GDPR impact assessment. Organisational controls, production configuration, vendor management, and independent audit remain deployment responsibilities.
| Implemented technical control | SOC 2 TSC | HIPAA Security Rule | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | GDPR | Repository evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strong KDF, per-vault/per-item keys, authenticated encryption, rotation, and cryptographic erasure | CC6.1, CC6.7 | 164.312(a)(2)(iv), 164.312(e)(2)(ii) | A.8.24, A.8.10 | Arts. 5(1)(f), 25, 32 | libs/neith/vault-crypto, libs/neith/vault-recovery |
| Versioned envelope encryption with non-extractable PKCS #11 key-encryption keys | CC6.1, CC6.7 | 164.312(a)(2)(iv), 164.312(e)(2)(ii) | A.8.24, A.8.10 | Arts. 25, 32 | libs/neith/vault-engine/src/hsm-kms.ts |
| Tenant namespaces, path/capability policy, collection ACLs, least-privilege roles | CC6.1–CC6.3 | 164.308(a)(4), 164.312(a)(1) | A.5.15–A.5.18, A.8.3 | Arts. 25, 32 | libs/neith/vault-engine/src/namespace.ts, policy.ts; libs/neith/vault-share |
| MFA/passkey and managed/compliant-device enforcement | CC6.1, CC6.6 | 164.312(d) | A.5.17, A.8.5, A.8.1 | Art. 32 | libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/policy.ts |
| Signed, chained administrative, sharing, and engine audit records | CC7.2, CC7.3 | 164.312(b), 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) | A.8.15, A.8.16 | Arts. 5(2), 30, 32 | libs/neith/vault-engine/src/audit.ts, libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/audit.ts, libs/neith/vault-share |
| Offboarding, session/device revocation, access transfer, and consented/HSM-escrowed recovery | CC6.2, CC6.3 | 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C), 164.308(a)(4) | A.5.16, A.5.18, A.6.5 | Arts. 25, 32 | libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/offboarding.ts, escrow.ts; libs/neith/vault-recovery |
| Encrypted sync/backup, region pinning, retrievability proof, and offline recovery | CC7.4, A1.2 | 164.308(a)(7), 164.312(e)(1) | A.5.29, A.5.30, A.8.13, A.8.14 | Arts. 5(1)(e)–(f), 32 | libs/neith/vault-sync |
| Quorum replication, fenced failover, authenticated catch-up, and controlled DR promotion | CC7.4, A1.2 | 164.308(a)(7) | A.5.29, A.5.30, A.8.14 | Art. 32 | libs/neith/vault-engine/src/ha.ts |
| Breach, weak/reused-password, expiry, HTTP, and EDR stuffing monitoring | CC7.2, CC7.3 | 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) | A.5.7, A.8.16 | Arts. 32, 33 | libs/neith/vault-watchtower |
| Data-loss copy policy, aggregate-only reporting/telemetry, travel purge | CC6.7, CC6.8 | 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(e)(1) | A.8.12, A.8.11, A.8.1 | Arts. 5(1)(c), 25, 32 | libs/neith/vault-enterprise/src/dlp.ts, reporting.ts, travel.ts; libs/neith/vault-autofill/src/telemetry.ts |
Open assurance and deployment dependencies#
- No SOC 2 examination, ISO 27001 certification audit, HIPAA risk analysis or business-associate workflow, or GDPR DPIA/records-of-processing exercise is represented by this matrix.
- Retention configuration and Apple/Windows/native-runtime validation remain open Phase 150 requirements. Android phone/Wear implementation and compiled automation exist, but still require device/KVM execution. Production HSM/KMS and multi-host HA deployments and their operator ceremonies remain deployment responsibilities beyond the exercised local integrations.
- Production evidence must add operator access reviews, key ceremonies, incident exercises, backup restore records, vulnerability management, availability measurements, and jurisdiction-specific retention/deletion decisions.
- Control owners must validate that deployed settings and contracts match the applicable organisation, data categories, threat model, and legal roles.